Crowdfunding, a fundraising mechanism in which monetary contributions are raised from a large number of people, is booming and impacting government policy. We study two features of a well-known crowdfunding platform, Kickstarter.com. First, we study the role of observable information in determining whether or not a donor contributes to the project. Second, we study the effect of the all-or-nothing nature of donations. Our counterfactual analyses indicate that the observability of donor information increases the expected quality of funded projects while the conditionality of pledges decreases it.
Introduction
The use of crowdfunding, a fundraising mechanism which attempts to raise money for a project from a large number of donors, is accelerating at a rapid pace. According to Massolution (2015) , a research firm specializing in the crowdfunding industry, global crowdfunding grew by 167 percent to reach $16.2 billion raised in 2014, up from $6.1 billion in 2013; and the industry is expected to raise more than $30 billion in 2015. A host of online crowdfunding platforms have sprung up from developing to developed countries to fund a variety of projects for social causes, entrepreneurial ventures, and for-profit businesses. 1 The explosive growth of crowdfunding together with some high profile successes (e.g., Pebble Watch raised more than $10 million on Kickstarter.com in 2012) has drawn much attention from both policymakers and academics. 2 While there are a growing number of academic studies on crowdfunding, our understanding of the effects of mechanisms behind the fundraising process is still limited. One of the issues that economists have often tried to observe in dynamic decision-making processes is social learning which occurs when agents learn by observing the past behavior of others. 3 In a crowdfunding platform, social learning may occur because potential donors can see how many other backers have contributed to a project. These type of effects have been studied by Zhang and Liu (2012) in a 'microloan' crowdfunding platform, Prosper.com. However, they did not examine the effect of the social learning on the relationship between the number and quality of projects which get funded.
Another important issue when it comes to raising funds for a project via crowdfunding is the conditionality of the pledges. In a All-or-Nothing platform, which a majority of crowdfunding platforms use, the project creator sets a fundraising goal and keeps nothing unless the goal is achieved by the end of the fundraising period. In a Keep-It-All platform, however, the creator collects the amount pledged regardless of whether or not the funding goal is reached. Cumming et al. (2015) study Indiegogo.com, where project creators have3 the option of choosing between the two regimes and most of the campaigns used the Keep-It-All model. They find that the Keep-ItAll campaigns were less successful in meeting their fundraising goals and interpret their findings as evidence of signaling.
In this paper, we study a well known and large crowdfunding platform, Kickstarter.com. First, we estimate the effect of the observable information on both the number and quality of projects 1 E.g., Youcaring.com hosts crowdfunding projects for various social and humanitarian causes; and Experiment.com for discipline-based scientific research projects. Recently, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has finally allowed non-accredited investors to participate in equity crowdfunding for small businesses under Title IV of the JOBS Act.
2 For instance, the European Commission recognizes crowdfunding as an emerging source of funding and has produced a guide on crowdfunding for small and medium-sized enterprises (see http://ec.europa.eu/growth/accessto-finance/funding-policies/crowdfunding/index en.htm). The U.K. has also released a detailed policy statement on online crowdfunding (Financial Conduct Authority, 2014).
3 Seminal papers such as Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992) spawned a large theoretical literature on informational herding or information cascade, which we do not attempt to survey here (see, e.g., Bikhchandani et al. (1998) and Mobius and Rosenblat (2014) for surveys).
that get funded. Specifically, there are two possible channels through which observable information may play a role. One is through observing the funding status of a project, or the percentage of the funding goal which had been donated. By observing this, consumers receive a signal about the project's potential for being funded, which may affect their decision of whether or not to donate.
For example, it may be the case that a potential donor is less likely to donate to a project if that project will not be funded. In other words, they may like to donate to a successful funding campaign. Another channel is through observing the previous number of backers of a project. This is a traditional observational learning signal which gives a potential donor an idea of the quality of the project. That is, the increase in the number of other people who have donated may increase the potential donor's belief about the quality of the project. Therefore, these two pieces of observable information may lead to herding behavior which implies that campaigns which would have not succeeded in the absence of this information may actually meet their funding goal. This may also distort the quality of projects which ultimately get funded, as donation decisions are not made purely on the expected quality of the project, but also on the funding potential and on an observational learning signal.
Second, we estimate the effect of moving from All-or-Nothing to Keep-It-All model. Specifically, on Kickstarter.com, donations are returned to a donor if the project isn't funded. This implies that people may be more willing to donate to projects with uncertain quality because there is less risk.
If donations are guaranteed, potential donors may shy away from projects which are unlikely to be funded. Thus, we examine how the All-or-Nothing mechanism affects the probability of projects being funded and the overall quality of projects which are funded.
To accomplish these two goals, we specify a structural model of a potential donor's decision of whether or not to donate to a project. In our model, the donor uses the current funding status and the number of days remaining in the funding period to form her belief on the probability the project will ultimately be funded. Using this belief, the donor forms her expected utility of donating to the project and compares this to the utility from not donating. Included in the expected utility are the preferences for a funded project, which we model as a function of the observed project characteristics along with the current number of backers. As noted above, the number of backers can be an observational learning signal which provides a donor with information about the project's true quality. We model the preferences for a funded project as a linear function of project characteristics and the current number of backers, where the donor's expected utility from making a pledge depends on both exogenous and endogenous states.
The data used to estimate the model are from 512 campaigns which were held on kickstarter in 2013. For these campaigns, we observe the daily number of backers and donations, along with static project characteristics. One weakness of the data is that we do not observe the total number of potential donors, meaning we do not know how many people chose not to donate to a project.
However, we observe the number of clicks to the project website's "short url" which can be thought of as the number of people who arrived to the project page from various social networking sites. Therefore, we model arrival as a Poisson process which is a function of these clicks, along with other things which potentially affect arrival. Using the expected utility function and the arrival process, we form the likelihood of the observe number of donations on a given day. We then find the parameters of the preferences, the belief of funding success function and the arrival process which maximize the likelihood.
Our results indicate that the observational learning signal, or the number of backers, is not significant. This suggests that potential donors do not take this as a signal of project quality.
However, we do find significant effects of the funding status, as potential donors are more likely to donate to projects which are closer to their funding goal. In addition, we find donors are sensitive to the amount of the potential donation, implying that the All-or-Nothing feature has an impact on the funding of projects. We then conduct two counterfactual experiments. In the first, we remove the funding status from the observable information. That way, a potential donor forms her belief about the funding probability using only the project characteristics. We find that the probability of a successful campaign increases slightly and that the overall quality of the successful projects decreases. That is, the information on funding status acts to restrict the number of successful projects because people are worried about donating to unsuccessful projects; however, this information leads to lower quality projects being successful because of herding. In the second, we make the donation disutility unconditional on the project's success. Predictably, this lowers the probability of fundraising success for some of the successfully funded projects, and we also find that this increases the average expected quality of successful projects, as people are more careful about which projects they donate to. Hence, the All-or-Nothing regime seems to facilitate herding effect.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literatures; Section 3 describes our data set; Section 4 presents the empirical model; Section 5 shows reducedform evidence; Section 6 contains the main results; and Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
Our paper is related to a few streams of literatures because social learning has been studied in a variety of contexts. Initially, the evidence took the form of clustered choices. For instance, Lakonishok et al. (1992) observe that pension fund managers tend to make similar investment decisions more than would be expected if they acted independently. Similarly, Duflo and Saez (2002) and Sorensen (2006) show respectively that savings account enrollment and health plan choices are more correlated across employees within the same department; and Conley and Udry More recently, researchers started documenting observational learning in product-level micro datasets. For instance, Zhang (2010) shows that patients may draw a negative quality inference from earlier passes in the queue, which leads to poor utilization in the kidney market; Moretti (2011) observes that box office sales of movies with stronger, and weaker, than expected opening week sales diverge over time; Zhang and Liu (2012) show that the effect of cumulative funding on peer-to-peer lending decision is influenced by the listing attributes; and Newberry (2015) quantifies the effect of observational learning in an online music market where a popularity-based pricing scheme is used.
Our paper is similar to this literature, in that we quantify the effects of observable information on consumer behavior. However, we specifically study this in the context of a crowdfunding platform, which allows us analyze how donors or investors react to this information, as opposed how consumers react to it. Therefore, our work can generally speak to how information may affect fundraising campaigns and the types of projects which receive funding, on kickstarter or in other contexts such as investment in a start-up. Further, we distinguish an observational learning signal on project quality from a signal about the likelihood of the project being completed. represented by shocks to website visits during the funding period. Also, in their model a donor's pledge is not conditional on the project reaching the goal (i.e., it is Keep-It-All) while our model is based on the observed All-or-Nothing feature and conducts a counterfactual analysis. Therefore, our analysis adds to the literature by quantifying the effects of information and the All-or-Nothing mechanism on fundraising success and the average quality of successful projects.
Data

Data Collection
Our data come from Kickstarter.com, which claims itself to be the world's largest funding platform for creative projects. 4 Project creators set their funding goals and only get to keep the donors' financial contributions if the total amount pledged exceeds the goal by the end of the funding period, which typically runs about 30 days. We refer to this as the All-or-Nothing mechanism of donations. Figure 1 shows a screenshot of the top of a screen for a project on Kickstarter.com.
Every project page has the same format as this. It starts with a project title and a video created by the project creator. Next to the video are the current number of backers and the total pledged amount. It also shows the funding goal ($10,000 in this example) and the days remaining until the fundraising ends. There are a couple of features that are important for our data collection. First, Kickstarter made it convenient for anyone to share a link to individual projects on social media. All they need to do is to click the name of the social media (e.g., Facebook and Twitter) or the "Share this project" button below the main video in order to post a short url to the project. Second, project creators post a menu of prices and rewards for the potential donors, part of which is shown on the right-hand side panel of Figure 2 . Rewards can range from a "thank you" note to various products and services. The menu prices differ across projects. Some may have three tiers (e.g., $10, $25, $50) while others may have 20.
We merge four data sources for a sample of kickstarter projects: (1) [8, 11, 13, 17, 8] . 5 The daily number of backers and amount of pledges for each project were collected from a Kickstarter-tracking website, Kickspy.com. Finally, we obtained daily number of url clicks on the short url from Bitly.com. URL shortening is a technique in which a website address is substantially shortened and still directs to the link. When a user shares a Kickstarter project through social media, the project page is automatically linked through a short url (rather than the full address).
Bitly is one of the largest url shortening services and has been officially used in Twitter since May 2009, and it was also often used in other social media such as Facebook and Google+. 6 We collected information on all short Bitly urls that were linked to each Kickstarter project.
Data Description
Due to the computational burden, we create a subset of projects for which we estimate the model.
Hence, the results presented in later sections pertain to this subset of projects. Therefore, we do not necessarily claim that our results can be generalized to other categories of projects or different crowdfunding platforms. However, we think that this subset is a good representation of the population of projects on Kickstarter, and we provide supporting evidence in Table 1 and also in Section 5.
In order to draw inferences for an average project, we begin by removing projects which appear as clear outliers. Specifically, we remove projects which have a goal that is at least $1 million (0.24% of total projects), those which have at least one day with over 300 pledges (4.5% of total projects), those with 0 total pledges (2.0% of total projects), and those which have at least one day with over 300 clicks of the small url (4.0% of total projects). Overall, this removes about 9.6% of the total projects and we are left with 21,726 projects.
We then limit our sample to one project category ("Film") and the three most popular subcategories within Film, namely, "Documentary," "Narrative," and "Short." Film is the most popular category on kickstarter, with about 20% of total projects, followed by "Music" (18%), then "Art" (17%). We chose the three subcategories because of their prominence within the category, as they make up about 65% of projects in Film. Overall, the subcategories we include cover about 12% of the total projects, or 2,898 projects.
Finally, we take a 20% random sample of these remaining projects, leaving us with 512 total projects. Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the entire data set, the three subcategories of Film, and the 20% sample from these projects. For the most part, the subset of projects we analyze are similar to the entire data set. The primary difference is that the projects in the "Film" category have a higher funding goal than projects in other categories, and also receive higher donation amounts with a similar number of backers.
The projects in our subset receive an average of $7,763 in pledges from 73 backers and have an average of 201 total clicks from the short url. On average, each project gets $322 per day from 3 backers and 7 clicks. Projects last about a month and have an average of ten reward levels. About 10% of our project creators come from New York and 19% from Los Angeles. They seem relatively new with an average of only 1 project created, but have been somewhat active, with an average of 3 other projects backed.
Empirical Model 4.1 Model
An arriving potential donor i makes the decision at time period t to either donate $I ij to project j or to donate nothing at all. We assume that $I ij is exogenous in our model, but we will aggregate over the observed distribution of donation in each level of the project's menu. We refer to donating to the project as the 'inside' good (good 1) and not donating as the 'outside' good (good 0). The total amount of time the project is live is denoted by T j , which is referred to as the funding period.
Therefore, the time remaining in the funding period is given byt = T j − t. Because our data is daily, t will refer to a given day andt is the days remaining in the funding period.
The utility for the potential donor contributing to the project is given by
where π jt is the belief the consumer has about the probability the project will reach its funding goal and ξ jt is the expected quality of project j at time period t. Notice that the donor only realizes this portion of utility and only pays I ij if the project is funded. This is due to the All-or-Nothing fundraising mechanism. The (unconditional) utility of donating is given by the iid error term, ijt , which represents idiosyncratic preferences of potential donors.
It is important to note that we do not allow the belief or the expected quality to vary across individuals, an assumption made because of data restrictions. Specifically, we observe the total number of donations placed, along with the value of the other observables, on day t, rather than information about each individual donation/donor. Therefore, we assume that all individuals who arrive in a given day have the same belief about the success probability and the same expectations about project quality. If there is a substantial amount of within-day variation in donations based on within-day changes in observables, our model cannot capture the effects of these observables.
We parameterize the expected quality of the project at time period t as
where X j is a set of characteristics of the project and the project creator which do not vary over time. We allow for learning effects about the quality of the project at time period t as follows.
The donor observes the current total number of backers, B jt , and uses it to form a belief about the project's quality. Therefore, B jt can be considered a signal of quality which is formed by observing how many other donors have previously contributed to the project. This allows potential donors to make naïve inferences from observing others' actions rather than necessarily in a fully Bayesian fashion. 7 The belief about a project's probability of funding success follows a logit specification,
where g jt is the percentage of the goal which has already been donated by time period t, or what we call the project's funding status. We also include the number of days remaining in the funding period and an interaction between this and the funding status. The reason for the inclusion of the interaction is that a project which is close to its goal with a long time remaining is more likely to reach the threshold than a project which is close to its goal near the deadline. We also allow for the utility of the project if it were funded,ū jt = ξ jt − αI ij , to enter the probability of funding success as this increases the expected probability that future donors will contribute, increasing the probability that the project is funded. 8 The utility for the outside good is assumed to be
Assuming is distributed according the Type II extreme value distribution implies that the probability donor i donates to the project is
7 Eyster and Rabin (2010; 2014) argue that the full-rationality model of observational learning predicts a relatively limited or unrealistic form of herding and does so in a relatively limited set of domains. In a lab experiment, Kübler and Weizsäcker (2004) find evidence that more subjects fail to take into account the fact that the previous players themselves have also inferred from still earlier actions.
8 This is a reduced-form representation of donors' forward-looking beliefs since a potential donor is not sophisticated enough to project forward all the possible outcomes for a given project. This assumption is consistent with the literature on limit order markets, which abstracts from a trader's endogenous cancellation and resubmission decisions (see, e.g., Hollifield and Miller, 2004; Hollifield et al., 2006) . and the probability of not donating is
.
Estimation
The parameters to be estimated are θ = {α, β, γ}. We note that there are two options to estimate the parameters of the success probability function, π jt . The first is to run a first-stage logit regression of equation (1) to estimate γ and use the estimates to form the expected probability of funding success for each j and t,π jt . We can then useπ jt as the 'projected' success probabilities and estimate the remaining parameters via maximum likelihood. This method implicitly assumes that donors have rational expectations. The other option is to estimate γ along with the other parameters in a full maximum likelihood routine. We choose to do the latter because we believe the rational expectations assumption may be too restrictive.
Given our data, we can form the likelihood of the observed number of donations in a given day, D jt , by integrating over both the donation levels for project j and the arriving potential donors on day t. Specifically, while we do not observe the chosen donation level for each individual, or even the overall distribution of donations on day t, we know the overall distribution for project j at the end of the funding period. We thus assume that the distribution of chosen donation levels on each day matches the overall distribution at t = T j . This implies that the probability an individual donates is given byP
whereĪ j is the set of possible donation levels for project j (i.e., the 'menu'), q j (ι) is the observed fraction of donors who chose to donate at level ι by the end of the funding period, and P ijt1 (ι; θ)
is the donation probability (2) when I ij = ι. (We now drop the i subscript if there is no risk of confusion.)
Next, we specify a Poisson arrival process where the expected number of arrivals, λ jt , is a function of the number of clicks on the project's short url on day t and a dummy variable indicating a Friday, Saturday or Sunday when people might have more time for 'eyeballs.' Thus, the probability that n donors arrive to project j on day t is
where
Here, C jt is the number of clicks on the project url (hereafter, 'clicks') and W jt is the 'weekend' dummy variable.
Given these assumptions, the probability of observing D jt donations on day t is given by
whereN is the maximum number of possible donors who arrive. Without serious loss, we set this to 500 per day.
Notice that we require that the number of arrivals, n, must be greater than both the number of donations, D jt , and the number of clicks, C jt . While the former is true by definition, the latter may not be true for a number of reasons; for instance, one possible donor clicks the url twice or someone clicks on the url without any intention of donating. While we believe it is reasonable to assume that arrivals are greater than the number of clicks, we have estimated a model without this assumption with little change in the results.
The log likelihood function can then be written as
We find the values of the parameters that maximize this likelihood function using the Accelerated Random Search algorithm.
The identification of the model is standard, in that it comes from the covariation between the values of the observables and the donation levels on a given day. However, there are a couple of important issues to discuss. First, the utility parameters, β, enter both the expected quality function and the success probability. Therefore, it brings into question how β are separately identified from γ u and γ u2 . Because a project can continue to receive donations after it reaches its funding goal (i.e., when π jt = 1), we observe changes in donating behavior which are directly related to utility of the funded project,ū jt , and not related to the success probability. This allows for separate identification of β and γ.
Second, the parameters of the arrival process are identified by how the donation levels are affected by changes in C or W , conditional in all the other observables. One might worry that arrival is a function of expected quality and/or success probability too. Because we do not directly observe the number of arrivals, we are not able to identify the impact of these observables on arrival separately from the impact on π jt or ξ jt . However, we believe that C jt can capture the endogenous process by which these observables may affect the number of arrivals. Along the same lines, to the extent that there is unobserved project-level heterogeneity which leads to more donations in time period t, this may be accounted for through the inclusion of C jt .
Reduced-Form Evidence
We now show some reduced-form evidence of the model presented above. We first examine what factors are correlated with successful fundraising. We run a logit regression where the dependent variable is whether or not the project is ultimately successful and the independent variables include various static characteristics along with variables providing information on the state of a project.
Following the previous works (e.g., Zhang and Liu, 2012; Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2013), the dynamic variables include the current funding status of the project (g jt ), the number of days remaining in the funding period (t), and an interaction between these two variables. Also included is the number of backers who have previously given to the project (B jt ).
The static variables included vary depending on the sample. When using all data, dummy variables for each project category (e.g., "Film" and "Music") are included; when using the "Film" subset, dummies for each of its subcategories (e.g., "Documentary" and "Short") are included; and when using the random sample, characteristics of the project creator as well as the average donation amount, a measure of the 'price' of donating to a project, are also included. Note that because we
are interested in what leads to a project being successfully funded, we exclude any activity which occurs after a project has been funded. This exercise can be thought of as the reduced form of the π jt function in the model specification. Results are presented in Table 2 .
The coefficients on the dynamic variables do not vary much across the three specifications. This provides some assurance that the sample we use for estimation is representative of the population of projects on Kickstarter. For the most part, the estimated coefficients fall in line with intuition.
For instance, as a project gets closer to its goal, the more likely it is that the project eventually gets funded. Further, the coefficient on the interaction term indicates that the percentage goal has a larger effect when there is more time left in the funding period. That a larger number of backers is associated with a decrease in the probability of a project's funding success, which suggests a crowding-out effect, is consistent with findings by Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2013) .
Next, we analyze donation behavior by running a linear regression of the number of donors on a day on the same regressors as above and the variables (Clicks and Weekend) that enter expected quality (ξ). Hence, this exercise can be thought of as the reduced form of the likelihood in our full model. We run two different sets of regressions, with and without project fixed effects. Results are presented in Table 3 . Some coefficients do not change significantly between the different samples.
For instance, the number of clicks on the short url is positively correlated with the number of donors. This provides some evidence that clicks can act as a shifter to the total number of arrivals to a project. It also seems that people are less likely to donate on weekends.
There is some variation in the results as we add the project fixed effect, implying that unobserved characteristics of the project may be important. The important comparison is between specifications (3) and (6) for our sample, where we see a larger coefficient on g jt and a switch of signs for the coefficients ont and B jt with project fixed effects. However, there are some reasons to take these results with some caution. For one, the omitted variable bias on the coefficient for g jt is likely to go the opposite way than we observe, leading to an overestimate similar to the one found in Zhang and Liu (2012) . Nonetheless, the positive and significant coefficient on g jt is in similar to their findings and may be interpreted as supporting the existence of some form of herding especially towards the end of the fundraising period.
Additionally, there is not a clear prediction of what the sign of the coefficient ont should be.
More days remaining in the funding period implies that there is more time to get funding, but people are also more likely to donate as the deadline approaches. Finally, the coefficient on B jt turns negative with the project-level fixed effects. This could be because there is indeed some crowding-out effect from past donations. Overall, our belief is that the unobserved heterogeneity could be an important factor in the reduced-form analysis, but its model specification remains an open question. While our model makes some simplifying assumptions due to computational burden, the results that follow complement the evidence in the existing literature and add to our understanding of the mechanics behind crowdfunding.
Results
Estimates
Results of the maximum likelihood estimation are presented in Table 4 with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses and the 95% confidence interval in brackets. We first discuss the factors which influence the expected quality of a project. The coefficients on the genre dummies indicate that short films are the highest valued, followed by documentaries and narratives. Taking the estimate of α as the price sensitivity, or utility weight, of the donor's preferences (where donation amounts are measured in thousands), we can estimate that short films are valued about 0.836 × (1/0.485) × 1, 000 ≈ $1, 700 more than documentaries, while narratives are valued about 0.967 × (1/0.485) × 1, 000 ≈ $2, 000 less.
Projects for which the creator is based in Los Angeles or New York are valued higher than other projects, with that value estimated to be about $1, 000. However, we caution that 0 is included in the confidence interval for these two dummy variables. Both the number of previous projects backed and created by the project creator seem to lower the expected quality of a project. That is, donors seem to prefer first time creators and regard project creators backing other projects potentially as not 'serious' film makers. The parameter on the number of backers is positive; however, it is not economically significant ($0.06 per backer), which implies that the learning effect on project quality does not play an important role in this platform.
We now move to the discussion of the estimated parameters that enter the perceived probability of funding success. Note that this can be thought of as the beliefs about the success probability conditional on the donor's information rather than the true probability. Therefore, any differences between these results and the reduced form estimates in Table 2 can be attributed to the donors having incorrect beliefs about this function. For the most part, however, donors seem to do a good job of predicting a project's likelihood of being funded.
Similar to the reduced-form estimates, the closer a project is to its goal, the higher the perceived likelihood that the project will be funded. Additionally, this effect becomes stronger as the time remaining in the funding period increases. In contrast to the reduced-form estimates, the time remaining decreases the expected probability of success. This implies that donors think that the likelihood of a project's success decreases as the deadline approaches. Finally, the expected quality of a project has a positive effect on the expected probability that the project is funded.
Next, we discuss the estimates of the arrival process. The number of clicks is positively related to arrival, and potential donors arrive more on Fridays, Saturdays and Sundays compared to other week days. Both these results are in line with the reduced-form estimates in Table 3 .
One interesting exercise is to examine the relationship between project quality and the success probability predicted by the model. To do so, we proxy project quality using only the static observables of a given project, when the number of backers is initially zero,
To form the predictions of the model, we simulate 2,000 different occurrences of a given project.
That is, for each project, we draw the number of potential donors who arrive on day one from the arrival process in equation (3), determine their actions, update the variables and then move to day two. We then draw the number of potential donors on day two, determine their actions, update the variables and continue like this until the funding period is finished. The probability of success is then the fraction of the 2,000 simulation runs in which the project reaches its goal. Figure 3 plots the simulated probability of project's success against its expected quality Q. In general, higher quality projects have more success. However, we do see a number of relatively high quality projects with a very small and even zero predicted probability of being funded.
Finally, we examine the fit of the model by comparing observed outcomes to those predicted by the model in Table 5 . Overall, the model under-predicts the average success probability. However, it does predict a significantly higher success probability for projects which were funded compared to projects which did not reach their funding goal. Most of the error in the predictions of the model occur because the model is less able to predict success for projects which were funded. This is also evident in Figure 3 as there are only a few black dots (=unfunded projects) with a high predicted probability, but many grey dots (=funded projects) with low predicted probabilities. The reason for this is likely that there are more unobserved factors which affect the success probability than we can account for in our model.
Counterfactuals
We analyze the effects of information and the All-or-Nothing mechanism on Kickstarter using counterfactual analysis. Specifically, we estimate the probability of funding success for each project under two different counterfactual scenarios and compare them to the outcomes predicted by the model. As previously mentioned, the effect of the number of backers is not significant. This implies that the counterfactuals that do away with the backer information changes the following results very little; we thus leave the expected quality Q j unchanged. To calculate the counterfactual outcome, we again simulate 2,000 different occurrences of a project and form the success rate from the fraction of the occurrences in which the project was funded. In order to directly compare outcomes, we use the same simulated donors as we did to calculate the model's predictions.
In the first counterfactual scenario, the projects funding status (g jt ) is removed from what the potential donor can observe. This restriction acts to force the donor to form an expectation of the project's funding success based solely on the project's static characteristics and the time remaining.
Results of this exercise are found in the second column of Table 6 . The average funding probability increases by only 0.6 percentage points, but nearly 20% of the projects increase their success rate. The reason for this is that, under the observed market structure, high quality projects receive early donations, increasing the likelihood they are funded, which leads to more donations and so on. When the funding status is unobservable, it does not play a role in the likelihood of success.
Lower quality projects benefit from the removal of the funding status for the same reason: the lack of donations in the early stages of the funding cycle will not affect the possible future donations.
Overall, we find that removing the funding status information decreases the expected quality of the funded projects by about 5.5% (see row 3 of Table 6 ).
In the second counterfactual scenario, we make the donation (I ij ) sunk, meaning that the donor must pay it to the project creator regardless of weather or not the goal is reached. This is examining the effects of moving from an All-or-Nothing to a Keep-It-All format. Specifically, the utility term is changed to π jt ξ jt − αI ij from π jt (ξ jt − αI ij ). Results of this exercise are found in the third column of Table 6 . We find that this move decreases the average success rate by 1.4 percentage points and decreases the likelihood of success for nearly 31% of the projects. Figure 4b indicates that many projects see a drop in success probability of over ten percentage points, with a number of these projects seeing a 20 percentage point decrease. The intuition of this result is that people are more apprehensive about donating to a project if their donation is guaranteed. That is, with the All-or-Nothing feature, there is a positive probability that the donation will be returned to the donor, increasing the expected utility of making a donation relative to an unconditional donation which is sunk with probability 1. This is also consistent with the fact that the projects affected the most by the Keep-It-All format are ones which were funded (i.e., gray dots in Figure 5b ).
As in the previous counterfactual, we see heterogeneity in the effects based on project quality.
The success rates for the very low and very high quality projects do not change much. This is due to the fact that people were not donating to the low quality projects even under the All-or-Nothing mechanism and donors were expecting the high quality projects to succeed anyway. The projects in the middle of the quality range are the ones where we see the most changes. These projects have the most uncertainty about their success, making the donation under All-or-Nothing less certain.
Overall, we find that moving to Keep-It-All increases the expected quality of funded projects by about 24% (see row 3 of Table 6 ).
Conclusion
A structural model of donor behavior was estimated using a sample of Film projects on Kickstarter.com. The reduced-form evidence supports informational herding from the current funding status and a crowding-out effect from the number of backers. However, the implications from our structural model are more subtle. There was no significant effect of the number of backers on expected project quality. It was demonstrated that overall the funding status decreases the fundraising success rate and increases the average quality of funded projects; and the All-or-Nothing mechanism increases the success rate and decreases the quality. Further studies are required to bridge the gap between the reduced-form evidence and the counterfactual analysis. Considering more flexible and computationally less intensive models would be a promising way to answer these questions. 
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